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A n export earnings stabilisation scheme (Stabex system) ist laid down in the Lome Convention, drawn up between (at present) 10 EC countries and 61 ACP states. The basic principle behind the Stabex system is to compensate for shortfalls in the ACP states' export revenue in trade with the EC and with the aid of the European Development Fund. Product-linked compensation is granted for 43 agricultural products and one non-agricultural product (iron ore). The Stabex system has been in force since 1975 (Lome I) and was contemporaneously extended with the renewal of the Lome Convention in 1979 (Lome II) 1. Although a renegotiation of the Lome Convention is not planned for the immediate future, the present point in time would seem suited for an appraisal of Stabex's performance for two reasons:
[] In 1981 financing problems cropped up within the Stabex system for the first time, necessitating a reduction in the compensatory transfer payments 2. This led to increased discussion on the evaluation of Stabex's role in development policy 3.
[] Individual parts of the Stabex scheme are seen as setting an example for a global system of revenue stabilisation, envisaged by the UNCTAD within the framework of the Common Fund 4. Stabex serves at least as a theoretical model for discussions on international revenue stabilisation policies 5.
Discussion up to date on the significance of the Stabex scheme for development policy is marked by a * Christian Albrecht University, Kiel.-Theresultsofthisarticlearepart of work carried out by the special research section 86 (World Economy and International Economic Relations) sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
lack of empirical analysis of its effects. To begin with this article endeavours to answer the question of whether Stabex payments in the 1975-79 application period have in fact stabilised export earnings in ACP countries. Subsequently, the amount of income transferred from the EC to the ACP countries by means of Stabex payments will be determined and an analysis of the distribution of the income transfers within the group of ACP countries conducted. In addition, an attempt will be made to establish whether the Stabex system creates unwanted allocation effects or whether Stabex is characterised by its "market neutrality".
Stabilisation Effects in the Stabex System
The conventional reasoning behind export earnings stabilisation policies propounds that economic growth in a developing country is lower if accompanied by "unstable" export earnings than if these earnings are STABEX "stable ''6. Taking this thesis as a starting-point, the most important factor for an evaluation of the Stabex scheme is whether it generates stabilising or destabilising effects on the national export revenues of the ACP countries. The confirmation of such a stabilising or destabilising effect, however, depends on the definition of the time-period concerned; the shorter the period of revenue shortfall is defined, the more difficult stabilisation becomes. In this article, a stabilising effect of a Stabex payment will be assumed if the relative deviation of export income, including the Stabex payment, from the "normal" revenue is, in any particular year of payment, less than the hypothetical non-Stabex situation. Thus, if a compensatory payment is effected during the period of revenue shortfall then a stabilising effect upon export revenue will be regarded as attained. So as to compensate if possible during the actual shortfall year, the Stabex programme provides for the possibility of an advance payment. The individual components of the Stabex system relevant to stabilisation in Lome II are:
(a) The EC Commission and the ACP states agree to take all steps necessary to guarantee a speedy transfer. In particular, advance payments may be granted (Art. 40, Par. 3). Otherwise, transfer applications are only admissible if filed before March 31 of the postshortfall year (Art. 38, Par. la).
(b) Stabilisation in the Stabex system is directed towards the product-linked revenue of ACP countries' exports to the EC (Art.24) and, as a special arrangement for (at present) 13 ACP countries, towards the total of product-linked export earnings of these particular countries (Art. 46, Par. 3).
(c) The basic principle behind Stabex is the compensation of losses in export earnings.
(d) Shortfalls in export earnings are to be fully compensated if the dependency threshold and the trigger threshold have been surpassed and if the Stabex funds are sufficient for this purpose. The "normal" level of revenue corresponds to the unweighted average for the four years preceding the year for which payment is to be granted (Art. 36, Par. 2).
Component (a) is the most important factor in deciding on whether the (partial) revenue stabilisation will actually be successful. Since applications and payments are possible in the consecutive year, destabilising effects can also occur. Component (b) further reveals that a stabilising effect on the earnings of ACP exports to the EC for one particular product does not necessarily mean a complementary stabilisation of the country's total export revenue, either for that product or as a whole. Component (c) implies that Stabex can only partially stabilise export earnings over a period of time since only the "revenue troughs" and not the "revenue peaks" are compensated for. Component (d) determines the amount of the Stabex payment and thus the degree of the stabilising or destabilising effect.
Destabilising Effects
A look at the actual dates of Stabex payments during the 1975-79 period of application reveals that hardly any use was made of the possibility of advance payments 7. Of the 123 Stabex payments only 8 applications were filed for advances. In the majority of cases contracts were signed for Stabex payments, and the amounts paid out, in the post-shortfall year (108 cases). In the remaining cases payments were made even later and in two extreme cases four years following the actual revenue loss. This demonstrates that the stabilising Table 1 empirically presents the stabilisation success of "large" Stabex payments during the initial years of application for twelve exemplary cases. The question is posed there whether the deviations in the revenue to be stabilised (product-linked earnings of ACP exports to the EC) from the "normal" export revenue were greater with Stabex than without it. As shown in Table 1 , the result is influenced by the definition of "normal" export revenue.
If, in line with the Stabex reference value, the average of the four export figures preceding the year of payment is taken as a measure of normal export revenue (NR 1 ), six cases are seen to demonstrate a stabilising effect and six a destabilising one. Excluding the advance payment to Senegal as an exception, there are predominantly destabilising effects. In individual cases these destabilising effects are considerable. The transfer to Ethiopia, for example, to cover shortfalls in export earnings in 1975 (coffee) was effectuated in 1976, a year in which Ethiopian coffee export earnings were 110 % above the reference value and those of exports to the EC 210 % above the reference value. As shown in Table 1 , the deviation of the effective export earnings from NR 1 increased as a result of the Stabex payments from 210.25 % to 336.95 %, in the case of the Ivory Coast (1976/timber) from 39.39 % to 51.16 % and in the case of Ghana (1976/timber) from 12.52 % to 38.44 %. A delayed payment leads, on the other hand, to a coincidental stabilisation effect if NR 1 is taken as a measure of the normal revenue and if a falling trend in export earnings is registered (e.g. Benin/cotton, Tanzania/sisal).
Even more unfavourable results are shown in Table 1 if the normal export revenue in any particular transfer year is calculated via a logarithmic trend function (NR2). In ten out of twelve cases, Stabex payments exert a destabilising effect; according to this calculation, the payment to Tanzania for sisal in 1977 and the advance payment to Senegal were the only stabilising elements. To sum up, the destabilising effects of Stabex payments on the revenue to be stabilised (productlinked earnings of exports to the EC) can be assumed to be in the majority. In addition to this, further empirical calculations 8 show that stabilising effects on the total export revenue of an ACP country are even more seldom. Apparently, the stabilising effects of the Stabex payments are purely coincidental, partially due to the lack of use made of the advance payment arrangement.
Distribution Effects
The Stabex system is not purely and simply an instrument of stabilisation, but also contains elements of redistribution. Compared to a situation without Stabex, redistributive effects are induced both between the EC countries and the ACP countries and within the group of ACP countries themselves. The UNCTAD, which is itself planning an international scheme of product-linked revenue stabilisation, emphasises the redistributive elements resulting from the varying terms of repayment as being a positive element of Stabex 9. Those parts of the Stabex scheme which bring about redistributive effects are described below. The amount and structure of income transfers during the Stabex period 1975-79 will be determined and their target conformity assessed. According to formula (1), the grant equivalent in a Stabex payment corresponds to the nominal value of the Stabex payment (L ST) minus the current value of future Stabex repayments (C~ T) and interest payments (I~T). T refers to the date on which repayment is due, rto the opportunity interest rate. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the nominal value of the payments, the lower the capital repayments and interest payments and the greater the grant equivalent in a Stabex payment will be. So as to empirically determine the grant equivalents in Stabex payments during the 1975-79 application period, the variables in equation (1) must be defined. The L sT values are the actual Stabex payments. The payment of interest does not apply in this case, hence I~mis equal to zero. The opportunity interest rates will vary from country to country; therefore, for the sake of simplicity, the interest burden for ACP countries of an alternative credit will be assumed to be equal to the average costs of a credit from the World Bank in the year of Stabex payment. Since the amount and the date of repayment depend on the development of exports, the quantity C~ m for principally repayable payments cannot be determined a priori. In an ex-post assessment the grant equivalent as regards the payment year increases with every additional year in which repayment is not made. 
Arbitrary Connection
Since Stabex payments are occasioned by export revenue shortfalls, the question should be raised whether the income transfers ascertained induce distributive effects different to those which would result from a direct policy of development aid for the ACP countries. If per capita income is taken as a distribution indicator, Table 2 does indeed show that the lowest income category was the primary beneficiary of grant elements up until 1981. However, more than 11% of all payments made in the period under review consisted of grants to the two "richest" income categories within the ACP group. This figure could increase considerably, especially if there is increasing non-repayment of Stabex credits by the "richest" group of ACP countries (Group I). After all, 22.1% of the Stabex payments were made to countries in Group I. Broken down according to individual countries it can be observed that the transfers in income occasioned by the Stabex payments 1975-79 benefitted countries in all income categories. The highest per capita grant equivalent went to Kiribati (40.78 EUA), followed by Dominica (37.57 EUA), Swaziland (25.93 EUA) and Mauritania (24.75 EUA), i.e. to countries with very different per capita incomes. It must be stressed, however, that all these countries do not belong to the group of the "poorest" ACP countries (Group IV), in which the grant equivalent amounted to less than 2 EUA/capita in eleven countries, i. e. in some cases was considerably below the level obtained by the richer ACP countries. Countries such as Malawi and Zaire, both in Group IV, received no transfers whatsoever during the first five years of the scheme's application. Stabex payments are expected to contain greater elements of redistribution in future since Lome II has incorporated further grant elements into its repayment arrangement as 
Uncontrolled Allocation Effects
It is often stressed that a positive effect of compensatory financing is its "market neutrality" in comparison with agreements on price stabilisation. Arguments are, however, put forward maintaining that the Stabex system could induce allocation effects due to its specific provisions. One argument, for example, asserts that Stabex could lead to an increased concentration on unstable export products in the ACP country and at the same time decrease incentives to diversify as compared to a non-Stabex situation 11. Furthermore, diversions in trade could occur with losses due to increasing transport costs. This is possible since as a rule only shortfalls in earnings of exports to the EC are compensated for 12. Undoubtedly, both kinds of allocation effect could in principle emerge. Their appearance depends on the degree of anticipation of Stabex payments by ACP governments in their trade policies. Hardly any empirical data for individual countries is available on this.
One further allocation effect is seldom referred to, even though it would seem a most likely one, since it does not presuppose any readjustment of ACP trade policies to future Stabex payments. Due to the relative importance of export monopoly-marketing boards on the Stabex markets it is possible that, assuming expenditure of Stabex payments in the sector in question, the marketing boards would pay the producers higher prices than in a non-Stabex situation. Producer prices would then contain a grant equivalent, which is based on a mixed calculation (world market prices plus Stabex grants) ~3. This is the more likely to be the case, the more Stabex payments contain elements of redistribution and are felt by the ACP countries to represent a long-term transfer of resources. More production factors will then be employed in the sector affected as a result of Stabex than in a situation in which this EC policy were not carried out.
All the afore-mentioned allocation effects could ensue and yet they need not always have a negative effect on the economy as a whole. Since we are dealing with a problem of second-best, the distortion of production 12 induced by Stabex can in individual cases lead towards a production optimum for the economy as a whole. Just like the stabilisation and distribution effects, however, these allocation effects are coincidental and un-9 controlled.
Conclusions
Treydte made the following statement concerning the primary effects of the Stabex system in 1977: "Stabex has contributed to the stabilisation of export earnings of the ACP countries, its function to improve the income situation of the countries has been pursued without disturbing the market mechanism ''14. The present analysis proves that such a positive evaluation cannot be supported.
The majority of the exemplary cases listed in Table 1 showed destabilising effects of the Stabex payments. With the exception of individual advance payments, the few stabilising effects were purely coincidental. Increased stipulations concerning the use of the advance payments arrangements would be appropriate policy measures to help avoid destabilisation effects.
It is true that Stabex transfers contained relatively large elements of redistribution, however, (a) these are not a primary objective of Stabex, and (b) the structure of the redistribution effects is purely coincidental. Nonconformity with the objectives of distribution policy is enhanced by soft repayment terms and a high divergence between opportunity and repayment interest rates for the "rich" ACP countries. A greater distinction between the redistribution elements and the stabilisation elements in a future Stabex policy could help to reduce this effect, particularly by aligning the repayment interest rate of the "rich" ACP countries to their opportunity interest rate.
If allocation effects are defined as a disturbance of the market mechanism then it has not been proven that Stabex did not disturb the market mechanism. The high percentage of redistribution elements makes it possible for higher producer prices to be paid via the marketing boards' mixed calculation than in a non-Stabex situation. A reduction in the coincidental redistribution elements in Stabex would therefore at the same time help reduce uncontrolled allocation effects.
